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1. INTRODUCTION
Dr Rooney’s paper, if I may say so, is quite abstract, and that made it challenging for me
to understand, because I have trouble with abstraction and am more at home with
concrete, situated examples. But if I do understand Dr. Rooney’s paper, this fact itself is
an illustration of one of her theses, namely, that gender is more complicated than the
simple male=abstraction, female=concreteness equations would have it. In these
comments I state my understanding of Dr. Rooney’s thesis, discuss a couple of its
implications, mention possible connections to recent argumentation theory and end with a
remark about methodology. I hope it becomes clear that I find the paper both informative
and suggestive.
2. THE ARGUMENT
I take Dr. Rooney’s thesis to be that feminist work that treats the social not as a-political
but as including relations of power and status contributes to revising our theoretical
understanding of abstraction (as distinct from the particulars of context) and of the social
(as distinct from the individual)—concepts important for our theorizing about cognition,
reasoning and logic.
The feminist work in question regards the identification of the abstract and the
individual with maleness and of sensitivity to context and the social with femaleness—
that is found, for example, in some interpretations of Gilligan’s findings or in Nye’s
critique of logic—as itself buying into a sexist construction of gender.
She argues that we need to replace the contrast between the person regarded as an
individual who engages in reasoning as a private act of decontextualized abstraction, and
the social individual whose nature is a function of networks of relationships and who
thinks always in terms of the particulars of each context. In its place we should regard the
individual as formed by social roles and relationships that tend to be shaped in part by
power and status, so there is never a private, disengaged individual, but always a person
whose very nature is socially constructed—that is, shaped by a history of gender, race,
culture, religion, status and other social factors. And we regard reasoning, cognition and
logic as always entailing some kind of abstraction, so the focus is not on the contrast
between the abstract and the contextualized, but on the degree and nature of the
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abstraction and, presumably, the role of the contextual in any particular analysis.
Moreover, the two interact. That is to say, the way in which an individual’s identity is
socially and politically shaped will affect the nature of the abstraction and its relation to
context exhibited in that person’s cognition, reasoning and logic.
3. IMPLICATIONS
Dr. Rooney suggests that the insights that she reviews, coming out of recent feminist
epistemology, offer directions for further research. She also mentions some implications
that have quite practical consequences.
For one thing, it follows from her analysis that tests of reasoning ability need to
be sensitive to how social and cultural factors may affect performance that is due to
different kinds of reasoning. Given the evidence that people in different cultures interpret
reasoning and logical tasks differently and so perform differently on them, the test
constructor needs to find ways to tailor either the questions or the grading scheme to
allow for these differences. We are still some way from having the detailed findings
needed intelligently to design our testing and grading along these lines. Perhaps the best
we can do for now is watch out for possible gender and other social influences on our
students’ performance. For example, I found that some students, for whatever reason—
not, as far as I can tell anecdotally, related to gender—have huge difficulty drawing
intelligible diagrams of argument structure, even though they can flawlessly describe in
words the logical and dialectical relations at work. So I made tree diagrams optional, and
accepted also prose descriptions of argument structure.
Similarly, Dr. Rooney suggests, those offering instruction in reasoning need to be
sensitive to the possibility that they are imposing particular socially and culturally bound
ways of understanding or interpreting problems and arguments. She points out that we
need to keep in mind that contexts and situations are social and can be experienced and
understood differently by people with different identities, since these place them in
different social locations, even in the same situation (p. 7). Dr. Rooney’s example is what
is a thought of as a harmless joke by one person being offensive sexism or racism to
another. In a class on law and punishment, to initiate discussion about kinds of
punishment in class I tossed out the suggestion of sending convicted felons to remote,
isolated, unpopulated areas, for example, Baffin Island. It turned out there was a student
in the class who came from Baffin Island and she was, understandably, extremely
offended by the example. The lesson is evident.
4. CONNECTIONS TO RECENT ARGUMENTATION THEORY
It strikes me that the enrichment of reasoning and argument analysis and evaluation by
the perspectives of dialectic and rhetoric that has occurred in the last twenty years, if
appropriately managed, might offer some of the nuance that Dr. Rooney is suggesting we
need. Considering arguments rhetorically when interpreting them means trying to
understand the audience that the arguer had constructed in framing the argument, and that
requires understanding the social and political situation of the arguer and of his or her
anticipated audience. And thinking rhetorically as an arguer means trying to identify the
thinking and attitudes of the audience, which includes being sensitive to their roles of

2

COMMENTARY ON PHYLLIS ROONEY
power and status and the attendant relations between the audience, arguer and context
that will shape the audience’s understanding and reception of the argument. All of this
requires self-awareness and an appreciation on the part of the arguer of how he or she is
likely to be perceived, including an appreciation of the role of his or her power and status
in that perception.
Thinking dialectically as an arguer entails anticipating the possible
misunderstandings, hesitations, doubts, and outright disagreements with which the
audience is likely to greet the core argument, and seeking ways to respond that will make
the argument clear and respond appropriately to those objections in the dialectical
elaboration of the argument. Thinking dialectically as the recipient and judge of an
argument entails trying to understand its dialectical functions, which means
reconstructing the challenges the arguer anticipates, and that in turn requires appreciating
the situation of the arguer.
I have been struck, in my teaching latterly, by how it is difficult at least in practice
to disentangle the rhetorical and dialectical perspectives from the logical, particularly if
logic is understood to be about what follows from what not just in the narrow sense of
what is deductively entailed by what, but also in the broader sense of what is supported
by what—what it is reasonable to concluded from the available or offered grounds. For
instance, what it is reasonable for me to conclude from the grounds you offer will depend
on how I ought to understand what you are offering as grounds, which requires
judgements about you, your roles and your relationship to me. And it also depends on
how well I take you to deal with my reasonable hesitations or doubts about those grounds
or their probative force, given my perspective. Here rhetoric, dialectic and logic merge.
I am suggesting that the best available understandings of ourselves and of those
with whom we interact in reasoning and arguing are essential from the perspective that
sees argument as the intersection of rhetoric, dialectic and logic. I take it that Dr.
Rooney’s point is that the insights of recent feminist epistemology, especially as they
apply to how we conceive of the social/individual nexus and the abstract/concrete nexus
contribute to that understanding.
4. METHODOLOGY
Another of Dr. Rooney’s examples comes from some revised readings of Descartes. As
noted, she argues that the social infuses the individual (p. 9), and so we can expect to
locate epistemic individualism within broader cultural understandings of individualism
(ibid.). In that light, she refers us to work on Descartes that connects his individualism
with his skepticism and situates these in a psycho-cultural context. She reports Bordo’s
argument for the influence of profound changes in the world of knowledge at the
beginning of the scientific revolution, and influence the themes of uncertainty, instability,
anxiety, and needs for foundation and certainty that motivate Descartes’s work (ibid..)
This also helps explain why the audience for Descartes’s work was so receptive (p. 10). I
would add that this sort of insight is not exclusive to feminist authors. Toulmin, for
example, similarly makes a case that Descartes’ drive for secure, certain foundations for
knowledge can be explained with reference to the terrible strife of the Thirty Years’ War
and the religious upheaval that motivated it. “The 17th-century philosophers’ ‘Quest for
Certainty’” he writes, “was … a timely response to a specific historical challenge—the

3

J. ANTHONY BLAIR
political, social, and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years’ War” (Toulmin
1990, p. 70).
This discussion of Descartes’ motivation raises a methodological issue. When we
seek explanations, for instance in terms of gender and power/status, etc., it is because we
think there are mistakes that need to be explained. If we believe a doctrine, belief,
method, attitude, etc., is correct, then it does not need to be explained why anyone would
espouse it. This applies to the explanations themselves as well. If we think an
explanation is plausible, we don’t seek further explanation of how it came to be proposed
or endorsed. It follows that explaining a doctrine presupposes a prior successful critique
of it.
The production of explanations is an important element of critique. For if a view
worthy of critique is mistaken, the question arises why an intelligent person would
endorse it. And since one of the factors making a view worthy of critique is that it is
widely shared, it needs to be explained why, in spite of its falsehood, a doctrine is widely
embraced. Thus a critique that does not also explain why an allegedly mistaken view is
maintained, especially if it is widely supported, is incomplete.
That said, explanations of the motivation behind a belief, theory, methodology,
etc., look like a type of ad hominem related to the abusive ad hominem. They seem to be
an attack on a thesis by means of an attack on the motivations of its proponent, which are
irrelevant to its truth. However, if the theory has been refuted, then explaining why it was
held by exposing the questionable attitudes and beliefs that motivated it is not fallacious,
for to do so is an explanation, not a refutation. On the other hand, if the theory has not
been refuted, then attacking as questionable the attitudes and beliefs that allegedly
motivate it as a means of discrediting it is fallacious, for it is question-begging—it
assumes, what in the context needs to be shown, that the belief, theory, methodology, or
whatever has to be explained because it is false.
To be sure, the relation between refutation and explanation is not in practice so
neat. We can come to suspect a doctrine’s truth if we have good reason to believe that its
endorsement can be explained by the fact that doing so supports perspectives such as
interests that are open to challenge. We cross the line into fallacious ad hominem only if
we take that fact alone as sufficient to refute the doctrine.
link to response
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